As of 2026, the military aviation of the Central Asian states is no longer a uniform structure consisting of five reduced versions of the Soviet Air Force. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are developing their air capabilities according to fundamentally different models. Therefore, a simple comparison of aircraft numbers now says very little about the actual combat value of their air forces.
The examples of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are particularly illustrative in this regard. A significant part of Uzbekistan’s combat fleet still consists of Soviet-era MiG-29, Su-27 and Su-25 aircraft, while Kazakhstan is systematically retiring its oldest platforms and placing greater emphasis on the Su-30SM, advanced military transport aviation and unmanned systems.
An objective assessment must take into account, at a minimum, the technical age and remaining service life of aircraft, the level of modernization, actual flight hours, crew training, the relevance of air-launched weapons, transport capacity, the presence of unmanned aviation, maintenance and repair infrastructure, and the country’s ability to sustain the operation of newly acquired platforms.
Another limitation of open-source data concerns UAVs. Regional states rarely disclose the exact numbers of medium- and heavy-class unmanned aerial vehicles. Small quadcopters, FPV systems and loitering munitions are also difficult to incorporate into general statistics in a meaningful way. Therefore, figures for large UAVs will be provided below only where they can be verified; otherwise, rather than inventing artificial figures, the types of known systems will be identified.
Kazakhstan: The Region’s Most Balanced Aviation System
Kazakhstan continues to be the Central Asian state with the most comprehensively structured air capability. Its advantage does not stem solely from the absolute number of aircraft, but from the presence of several advanced components at the same time: multirole fighter aircraft, attack aviation, a large helicopter fleet, a two-tier military transport aviation structure, and a steadily expanding unmanned component.
The current GlobalMilitary database lists 13 MiG-29s and assesses the Air Defense Forces’ fleet at approximately 185 aircraft, including five major UAVs. However, FlightGlobal’s World Air Forces 2026 directory considers Kazakhstan’s MiG-23/27/29 fleet to have been retired. Therefore, rather than relying on a single formally precise figure, it is more realistic to estimate the total at approximately 170–185 major aircraft, depending on the methodology used and the status assigned to aircraft held in reserve.
Fleet Structure
The backbone of Kazakhstan’s combat aviation consists of the Su-30SM and Su-27, supported by approximately 15 Su-25s. The exact distribution between the Su-27 and Su-30SM varies across international sources. GlobalMilitary currently lists 36 aircraft in the combined Su-27/30 category and three additional Su-27s, while earlier FlightGlobal publications gave significantly higher totals for the Su family. Therefore, the most reliable assessment is that Kazakhstan operates several dozen Su-27/Su-30 aircraft, with the Su-30SM increasingly assuming the role of the country’s principal modern multirole fighter.
This situation qualitatively distinguishes Kazakhstan from most of the region. Su-30SM aircraft have been entering service for several years. Kazakh pilots and technical personnel have undergone the necessary conversion training, and the aircraft have been distributed to active aviation units. The Ministry of Defense has linked their acquisition to the country’s rearmament program.
For a country covering 2.7 million square kilometers, the heavy Su-30SM is a highly rational choice. Its long range, two-seat cockpit, ability to conduct extended patrols, aerial refueling capability, and capacity to perform both air combat and strike missions allow Kazakhstan to cover a broader range of missions with fewer platforms.
The attack component is maintained by the Su-25. Although this is an aging design, it remains relevant for close air support and direct support of ground forces, particularly where modernized and serviceable aircraft are available.
The helicopter component is also among the largest in the region. Open sources indicate approximately 49 Mi-8/17s, 12 Mi-24/35s, eight H145s, two heavy Mi-26s and several other types. Such a fleet can simultaneously perform transport, airborne assault, search-and-rescue and attack missions.
Military Transport Aviation – One of the Key Advantages
This is one of the areas where the difference between Kazakhstan and most of its neighbors is most pronounced.
The fleet includes nine C295 military transport aircraft, approximately six An-24/26s, several L-410s, An-72s and the first heavy-class A400M Atlas.
Airbus has confirmed that Kazakhstan ordered two A400Ms: the first aircraft was delivered in December 2024, while delivery of the second was planned for 2026. The contract also includes training and technical support.
The A400M is moving Kazakhstan’s military transport aviation from a predominantly tactical capability toward the tactical-strategic level. The aircraft can transport heavy and oversized cargo, personnel and military vehicles, while also operating from airfields with limited preparation.
The most important factor is the ability to use the A400M and C295 together. Kazakhstan does not have to deploy a heavy aircraft for missions that can be adequately performed by the C295. This creates a tiered transport system, a capability that no other Central Asian state currently possesses in the same form.
Unmanned Aviation
When only reliably known major unmanned systems are considered, Kazakhstan’s inventory includes Wing Loong-1, ANKA and Skylark-1LEX. The Ministry of Defense has also officially disclosed the Belarusian-made “Busel-10” system. The number of Skylark and other lighter systems has not been publicly disclosed.
Wing Loong belongs to the reconnaissance-strike UAV class and is capable of employing guided weapons. The Turkish ANKA system successfully completed operational trials and was officially accepted into service.
Some industry publications citing SIPRI have also reported that Kazakhstan acquired Aksungur. However, the number of such systems and their current status within the national fleet have not been publicly disclosed. It would therefore be premature to include them in a definitive total.
More important than the number of UAVs already acquired is the industrial perspective. In May 2026, Kazakhstan and Türkiye formalized the establishment of a joint venture between Kazakhstan Engineering and Turkish Aerospace for the local production and technical maintenance of ANKA systems in Kazakhstan. According to published information, Kazakhstan will become the first foreign country to produce this Turkish system. Earlier agreements envisaged technology transfer and the training of Kazakh specialists.
Kazakhstan is therefore moving beyond a simple UAV procurement model toward the creation of its own production and maintenance capabilities. In parallel, the armed forces are developing capabilities to assemble smaller unmanned systems and FPV drones at the level of specialized training units.
This represents a significant long-term advantage: an imported UAV fleet can be lost or reach the end of its service life; an indigenous technological base, however, makes it possible to replenish and upgrade that fleet.
Flight Hours and Training Level
This is precisely the area in which Kazakhstan has the strongest evidence-based advantage among the five Central Asian states.
The Ministry of Defense reported that in 2025, the total flight time of aircrews of the Air Defense Forces exceeded 12,000 hours. More than 13,000 flight hours had previously been reported for 2023.
Kazakh crews conduct night operations using night-vision equipment, covert flights with aircraft navigation lights switched off, air combat, strikes against ground and maritime targets, aerial reconnaissance, and coordinated operations with air-defense elements.
During the “Combat Commonwealth – 2025” exercise, Su-30SMs, Su-25s and helicopters carried out missions involving the penetration of simulated enemy air defenses, close-in maneuvering air combat, destruction of ground targets and repulsion of a concentrated air attack. ANKA and Skylark systems were also employed.
These data make it possible to assess Kazakhstan’s flight-training level as the highest in Central Asia and, importantly, the best-supported by publicly available evidence.
Recent Deliveries and Potential
The second A400M is expected to be delivered in 2026.
Cooperation with China is even more noteworthy. On September 3, 2026, the German magazine Flug Revue, citing materials published by Kazspetsexport, reported on negotiations between Kazakhstan and CATIC held from August 11–13. According to these documents, the Y-9E was discussed, and an agreement may have been reached on the acquisition of six K-8W advanced trainer/light combat aircraft. The K-8W program is reportedly expected to require approximately 26 months to reach full readiness.
It would be incorrect to view the K-8W as an alternative to the Su-30SM. Its primary role is to create a more modern training tier and replace part of the L-39 fleet while improving the training of future combat pilots.
If implemented as planned, the Y-9E would complement Kazakhstan’s C295 and A400M transport fleet and further strengthen Kazakhstan’s military transport component.
Thus, Kazakhstan’s principal development potential is emerging along several parallel tracks: modernization of combat aviation, development of heavy airlift capability, renewal of training aircraft, expansion of the UAV fleet, and localization of production.
In the 2028–2030 timeframe, this gives Kazakhstan the region’s most balanced development trajectory.
Uzbekistan: The Largest Numerical Fleet and the Most Challenging Transition
Uzbekistan is currently Kazakhstan’s principal competitor in the aviation sphere.
As of September 8, 2026, GlobalMilitary counts 202 manned aircraft following the addition of the first batch of J-10CE fighters. Of these, 82 are classified as combat aircraft, 101 as helicopters, 13 as transport aircraft and six as trainers.
However, the structure of these 202 platforms demonstrates why a purely numerical comparison can be misleading.
Fleet Structure
The backbone of the fighter fleet remains Soviet-era aircraft: depending on the methodology, approximately 38 MiG-29s, 20–25 Su-27s and 13–20 Su-25s.
The current GlobalMilitary database lists 38 MiG-29s, 25 Su-27s and 13 Su-25s. FlightGlobal’s World Air Forces 2026, using different estimates, lists 39 MiG-29s, 21 Su-27s and 20 Su-25s.
The discrepancy itself illustrates the central problem: the presence of an aircraft in the inventory does not mean that it is continuously operational.
It would therefore be incorrect to treat several dozen Uzbek MiG-29s as equivalent to the same number of modern multirole fighters.
The major change in 2026 has been the arrival of the J-10CE.
On August 28, Uzbek state television officially showed Chinese-made fighter aircraft for the first time. At least six aircraft were clearly visible in the footage. As of September 2026, the total order size, contract value, delivery schedule and weapons package have not been publicly disclosed.
The J-10CE is undoubtedly the most modern combat platform in the Uzbek Air Force. Its AESA radar, digital avionics and ability to employ China’s long-range missiles potentially provide a completely different level of capability in air-superiority operations compared with older MiG-29s.
However, the key word here is “potentially.”
At present, only six aircraft have been visually confirmed and they have only recently entered service. Achieving full combat readiness will require the training of sufficient numbers of pilots and technical personnel, establishment of engine and spare-parts stocks, mastery of the weapons systems and integration of the Chinese platform into the existing command-and-control architecture.
Helicopters and Transport Aviation
Uzbekistan possesses a strong helicopter component: approximately 39 Mi-8s, 34 Mi-24/35s, 16 H215M/AS532s and approximately 12 light H125/AS350/550 aircraft.
Tashkent also possesses significant maintenance and repair capabilities. In January 2026, a certified Airbus maintenance center for the H125, H215 and H130 was demonstrated at the Chirchiq Aviation Repair Plant. At the same time, renewed capacity for major repairs and deep modernization of the Su-25 was presented.
According to current open-source assessments, the transport fleet includes four An-26s, four C295s, three Il-76s and two An-12s. These will be supplemented by the new C-390 Millennium.
On February 3, 2026, Embraer officially announced Uzbekistan as a C-390 customer and stated that the republic would become the first operator of the type in Central Asia. Industry data indicate a two-aircraft batch, although Embraer’s own press release did not specify the number.
The C-390 will significantly improve the Air Force’s strategic mobility.
At the same time, however, it will make the fleet structure even more complex.
The Problem of Technological Fragmentation
This is probably the most important long-term disadvantage of the Uzbek model.
The country will simultaneously operate Soviet-Russian platforms such as the MiG-29, Su-27 and Su-25; Chinese J-10CE fighters and associated Chinese weapons; European Airbus Helicopters and C295 aircraft; and now Brazilian-made C-390s.
On paper, this is referred to as diversification.
From the standpoint of supply continuity, it does indeed reduce dependence on any single state.
Operationally, however, it creates several independent logistical ecosystems: different engines, diagnostic equipment, software, weapons, simulators, technical documentation and specialist teams.
Kazakhstan is also diversifying its fleet, but it is doing so more gradually. It is not attempting to replace the core of its combat aviation all at once; instead, it is introducing new technological ecosystems primarily in transport, training and unmanned aviation.
Unmanned Aviation
Uzbekistan is developing rapidly in this area.
At least four Bayraktar TB2s have been confirmed. Chinese-made Wing Loong-1 systems, the indigenous vertical-takeoff Lochin, the American Puma 3 AE and Russian ZALA 421-16E systems have also been observed at parades and public events. In 2025, Airbus confirmed that Uzbekistan had purchased the vertical-takeoff Flexrotor system.
The exact number of most systems has not been disclosed.
Therefore, Uzbekistan’s unmanned component can be described as broad in terms of platform diversity but less mature in terms of operational integration.
Training and Flight Hours
This is where a major problem arises for objective comparison.
On June 8, 2026, the President of Uzbekistan stated that the scale of practical flight training had increased several-fold in recent years and that the combat readiness of aviation units had improved.
This is an important positive indicator.
Taking the available evidence together, the current core personnel of the Uzbek Air Force can reasonably be assessed as having an improving level of training. However, the newly acquired J-10CE fleet is clearly still in the initial stages of familiarization and adaptation.
A pilot converted to the J-10CE does not automatically become a fully trained combat pilot on the new type. Hundreds of training scenarios must be completed at the unit level, including group employment, BVR combat, coordination with ground-based air defense, employment of different weapons, electronic countermeasures and operations in an environment of heavy electronic interference.
This is precisely the stage now facing Tashkent.
The Cost of the J-10CE
The widely circulated claim of approximately $1 billion for 24 J-10CE aircraft also requires careful examination.
As of today, these two parameters have not been officially confirmed.
However, if these figures are assumed for the sake of analysis, simple division gives approximately $41.7 million per aircraft within the program.
For comparison, publicly reported data concerning the Pakistani contract indicate approximately $1.525 billion for 20 J-10CEs, including ten spare WS-10B engines and 240 PL-15E missiles. Dividing the total program value by the number of aircraft produces approximately $76.3 million per aircraft.
The 2026 Bangladesh program is even more notable: $2.302 billion for 20 J-10CEs. The aircraft’s basic price is reportedly around $62.7 million, while training, logistics, technical support, infrastructure and other costs bring the total program value to approximately $115 million per aircraft.
Uzbekistan may have overpaid, or it may have purchased aircraft in a simplified configuration with a more limited support package. Contract structures differ.
However, the assumed $41.7 million price requires an explanation.
It is not known how many missiles are included, whether spare engines are part of the package, what simulators and ground equipment are included, how much multi-year support has been purchased, or how much training is provided.
There is also an alternative calculation: if the $1 billion figure refers to 12 aircraft, the resulting program value would be approximately $83.3 million per aircraft. This is much closer to the Pakistani example.
This does not constitute evidence of a 12-aircraft order. However, it is a serious argument against automatically treating the “$1 billion for 24 aircraft” figure as an established fact.
The Uzbek J-10CE aircraft shown publicly also appear different from the Pakistani configuration because they lack a fixed aerial-refueling probe. The contents of the weapons package are likewise unknown.
Potential
Uzbekistan’s potential is very high, but its model is more dependent than any other on successful management of the transition period.
If the actual J-10CE fleet consists not of six but 12–24 aircraft, if sufficient PL-15E/PL-10 ammunition is acquired, if engine reserves are established and if a high-quality training system is created, Uzbekistan could build the region’s most modern combat aviation component based on a single fighter platform.
However, if the program remains limited to a small batch or a restricted support package, its impact will be considerably more modest.
Turkmenistan: A High Aircraft Count Despite an Aging Combat Core
According to open-source assessments, Turkmenistan’s Air Force operates approximately 92 manned aircraft: 54 combat aircraft, 26 helicopters, six transport aircraft and six trainers.
This makes Turkmenistan the third-largest aviation power in Central Asia in terms of total capability.
However, the structure of its fleet is fundamentally different.
Fleet Structure
The main combat aircraft are approximately 24 MiG-29s and 25 Su-25s.
Counting methodology should again be taken into account. Some Su-25s are classified in sources as two-seat trainers. Consequently, figures of 18 combat aircraft and seven trainers can also be found in some sources. The same applies to part of the MiG-29UB fleet.
Nevertheless, the fundamental problem is clear: the overwhelming majority of the heavy combat fleet consists of Soviet-era aircraft.
Ashgabat has attempted to compensate for this through new acquisitions.
The country operates four M-346FA aircraft, along with two M-346s used as advanced trainers. Italy previously disclosed a contract for four M-346FAs and two M-346 trainers worth a total of €293.1 million.
The M-346FA is not a heavy multirole fighter in the same class as the Su-30SM or J-10CE. However, it is a modern light combat platform with advanced avionics capable of performing limited interception, reconnaissance and precision-strike missions.
Turkmenistan also has approximately five A-29 Super Tucanos. These are useful for patrol, counterterrorism and operations against low-speed air and ground targets, but they are not substitutes for fighter aircraft.
Thus, although a modern segment exists, the center of gravity of the Air Force remains the MiG-29 and Su-25.
Transport and Helicopters
Open databases list two C-27J Spartans, two An-74s, one An-26 and one Il-76 in the transport fleet.
The helicopter fleet includes approximately 15 Mi-17s, ten Mi-24s and several Italian-made platforms. GlobalMilitary also lists eight AW139s as being on order. However, open sources are not sufficiently transparent regarding the delivery schedule and actual status of this batch.
Unlike Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan does not possess a heavy and modern transport platform comparable to the A400M. Nevertheless, the C-27J is highly suitable for tactical airlift missions.
Unmanned Systems
Turkmenistan began acquiring unmanned systems earlier than many of its neighbors.
The presence of Bayraktar TB2s has been confirmed. Independent researchers refer to at least three systems, while some sources list six.
The inventory has also included Italian Falco, Chinese CH-3A and WJ-600A/D, Israeli Orbiter, several Skylark and ScanEagle 2 systems, as well as systems from the Belarus-supported Busel family.
Exact numbers remain undisclosed.
Therefore, it is more accurate to speak of a broad range of unmanned systems including at least several reconnaissance-strike complexes, rather than attempting to produce an artificially precise total.
Pilot Training
There are no reliable publicly available data on the annual flight hours of Turkmen military pilots.
This significantly reduces confidence in any assessment of combat readiness.
On the one hand, the M-346 provides a strong technical foundation for advanced jet-pilot training. The aircraft was specifically designed as an advanced jet trainer.
On the other hand, compared with Kazakhstan, open sources provide far less evidence of broad and regular combat training.
Turkmenistan’s training level can therefore be cautiously assessed as medium, with some well-equipped units. However, there is insufficient evidence to state with confidence that the intensity of flight training is comparable to that of the Kazakh Air Force.
Potential
The key issue for Turkmenistan in the 2030 timeframe will be the replacement of its MiG-29 and Su-25 fleet.
The M-346FA and A-29 do not possess the numerical or operational capacity to replace the entire Soviet-era combat fleet.
There is currently no publicly confirmed program for the acquisition of a full-fledged new-generation multirole fighter.
Therefore, without a major new contract, the gap separating Turkmenistan from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will continue to widen. This remains true despite the fact that the nominal number of aircraft in the Turkmen fleet remains relatively high.
Kyrgyzstan: Almost No Manned Combat Aviation, but a Strong Shift Toward UAVs
It makes little sense to compare Kyrgyzstan with the previous three countries solely by aircraft numbers.
In September 2026, GlobalMilitary lists only nine manned aircraft: five Mi-8/17s, two Mi-24s and two An-26s. FlightGlobal provides an even more conservative picture, focusing primarily on seven helicopters.
There is no modern fighter component.
However, in recent years Kyrgyzstan has deliberately begun compensating for this weakness through unmanned systems.
Unmanned Fleet
Bishkek appears considerably stronger in this area than the size of its conventional air force would suggest.
The presence of Bayraktar TB2, Aksungur, ANKA-S and heavy-class Akıncı systems has been confirmed. Warsight, citing SIPRI data, lists all four Turkish system families in the inventory of the Kyrgyz armed forces.
Reliable numerical information on the Akıncı is sufficient to provide a firm figure: an updated Shephard database from September 2026 lists three systems ordered, three delivered and three in the Kyrgyz inventory.
Open-source estimates for the TB2 indicate at least three systems.
The exact numbers of Aksungur and ANKA-S systems have not been reliably disclosed.
Therefore, even based solely on confirmed major systems, it is possible to speak of at least six major strike UAVs – three Akıncı and at least three TB2s. Systems such as Aksungur and ANKA-S, whose exact numbers are unknown, would be added to this figure.
This means that once UAVs are taken into account, Kyrgyzstan’s total air component looks very different from the nine aircraft and helicopters reflected in conventional databases.
Training
No open-source data are available on annual flight hours.
The Kyrgyz Ministry of Defense has published information concerning training flights, including the execution of emergency procedures. However, the manned aviation fleet is so small that it is not possible to speak of a fully independent and comprehensive fighter-pilot training system.
The training of UAV operators is far more important.
Turkish systems of different classes are employed during exercises. FPV systems were also used during joint Kyrgyz-Russian maneuvers in August 2026.
Therefore, Kyrgyzstan’s aviation specialization is increasingly shifting from conventional air force capabilities toward unmanned reconnaissance and strike assets.
Potential
In April 2026, the country’s leadership tasked the Dastan enterprise with developing domestic UAV production. At the same time, options for cooperation with foreign companies, including Chinese firms, were reportedly being examined. The type of systems to be produced and the depth of localization remain unknown.
If implemented, the program could create a highly interesting model: a small manned aviation fleet combined with a comparatively strong unmanned aviation component.
However, without modern fighter aircraft, advanced airlift capability and a large helicopter force, such a component would not make Kyrgyzstan a full-scale competitor to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan.
Tajikistan: Helicopter Aviation and Limited Independence
Tajikistan has the most limited independent aviation capability in Central Asia.
Open assessments for 2026 indicate approximately 26 manned aircraft: 14 Mi-8s, six Mi-24s, four L-39s, one An-26 and, at some bases, one auxiliary Tu-134. FlightGlobal provides a similar picture but does not include the latter type.
The fundamental characteristic is clear: there is no full-fledged fighter aviation component.
Helicopters form the core of the air capability.
Mi-8s perform transport and airborne-assault missions, while Mi-24s conduct limited attack missions. The L-39s are primarily trainers and cannot be considered substitutes for full-fledged combat aircraft.
UAVs
Tajikistan is the least transparent example in the region.
There have been reports that the border guard service operates Chinese-made Wing Loong systems. Their exact number and configuration have not been disclosed.
In 2022, Iran announced the opening of a facility in Dushanbe for the production of Ababil-2 systems.
However, subsequent open-source investigations raised serious questions about the actual scale of the project. As of March 2026, RFE/RL journalists were unable to independently verify that the announced facility was operational.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to include dozens of hypothetical Tajik Ababil systems in the country’s aviation inventory.
At present, it is possible to state only that there is an identifiable shift toward unmanned aviation, but no large-scale national production capability has been conclusively demonstrated.
Flight Hours and Training
There is no reliable information on annual flight hours.
Since there are no fighter units, combat training must primarily be assessed in terms of helicopter crews.
The missions are also more limited: transport support, troop movement, patrols and support for ground forces.
Tajikistan is also significantly integrated into Russia’s collective air-defense system. Consequently, the absence of fighter aviation is partially offset by external security mechanisms. However, this does not increase the size of the country’s own aviation fleet.
The small number of aircraft naturally limits the ability to develop large numbers of experienced crews and maintain high flight-training intensity.
Potential
In the short term, there are no indications that Tajikistan will establish a full-fledged fighter aviation capability.
The most realistic development areas are helicopters, reconnaissance UAVs, border control and the strengthening of air defense.
Therefore, the gap with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will remain.
What Does the Comparison Show?
As of September 2026, the Central Asian states fall into several distinct tiers of aviation capability.
Kazakhstan ranks first in terms of the overall maturity of its aviation system. Its principal advantage is the combination of an operationally established Su-30SM fleet, advanced transport aviation, a large helicopter component, a verified high aggregate flight-hour figure, and the transition toward localization of unmanned technologies within a single system.
A particularly notable figure is the total of more than 12,000 flight hours recorded in 2025. No other Central Asian state currently publishes a comparable absolute figure. Although this does not allow precise calculation of flight hours per pilot, it provides the strongest publicly available evidence of flight-training intensity in the region.
Kazakhstan’s second advantage is structural balance. Its inventory includes fighter aircraft, attack aviation, heavy and medium transport aircraft, combat and transport helicopters, MALE-class UAVs and tactical unmanned systems.
The third factor is industrial potential. Kazakhstan already possesses experience in local assembly and maintenance of Airbus Helicopters platforms. Between 2012 and 2024, approximately 180 aviation engineers and 100 pilots were trained locally. The same approach is now being extended to the ANKA program.
The fourth factor is diversification. The possible emergence of K-8W and Y-9E programs demonstrates that Kazakhstan does not intend to become completely dependent on a single aviation school.
Uzbekistan ranks second, but its growth potential is very high. It has acquired the J-10CE, is modernizing the Su-25 and is preparing to operate the C-390.
Its weakness is that the entire system remains in transition.
A large portion of the fleet is still Soviet-era. The technical readiness of dozens of MiG-29s and Su-27s is unknown. Only six J-10CEs have so far been visually confirmed. The total batch, weapons package and support system have not been disclosed. Annual flight hours are not published. At the same time, an extremely complex multinational logistics structure is being created.
Therefore, the J-10CE already increases Uzbekistan’s potential, but it is not yet sufficient to automatically declare Uzbekistan the strongest aviation power in the region.
Turkmenistan ranks third.
Its 24 MiG-29s and significant Su-25 fleet still represent substantial numerical strength. The M-346FA and A-29 provide partial technological renewal. However, the core of the fleet is aging, flight-hour data remain classified or unavailable, and no transparent program for complete fleet renewal has yet emerged.
Kyrgyzstan ranks fourth, with one important exception: in terms of unmanned capability, it is considerably stronger than its conventional aviation capacity would suggest. Akıncı, Aksungur, ANKA-S and TB2 provide reconnaissance and precision-strike capabilities far beyond what nine manned aircraft could deliver.
Tajikistan remains fifth. Its aviation is primarily a helicopter component supporting ground forces, supplemented by a small training and transport segment. An unmanned aviation program exists, but its actual scale remains the least certain in the region.
How Could the Balance Change by 2030?
The central question in the coming years is no longer simply how many old MiG-29s or Su-25s remain in inventory.
For Kazakhstan, the decisive factors will be the entry into service of the second A400M, further modernization of the fighter fleet, potential K-8W and Y-9E programs, and especially the actual launch of domestic ANKA production and maintenance.
For Uzbekistan, the decisive factor will be the real size of the J-10CE acquisition.
Six fighter aircraft strengthen an existing fleet.
Twelve aircraft could form the sustainable core of a new combat aviation component.
However, this requires sufficient stocks of PL-15E and other weapons, spare engines, trained crews, engineering personnel and a long-term support system.
For Turkmenistan, the key issue will be the decision on replacing the MiG-29 fleet.
For Kyrgyzstan, the decisive factor will be the transition from importing Turkish UAVs to genuine domestic production.
For Tajikistan, the central issue will be whether its still insufficiently verified unmanned aviation program can be transformed into a functioning capability.
Ultimately, the country entering the next phase of aviation modernization from the strongest starting position is Kazakhstan.
Uzbekistan is currently purchasing a technological leap. Kazakhstan is building an aviation system step by step.
In the short term, the first approach may appear more impressive.
In the long term, however, the second approach potentially offers a more sustainable foundation for combat readiness.
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