By Beatrice Hainaut – Featured Contributor, AzurX Knowledge Hub
In recent years, the space sector has undergone profound changes. It has not yet stabilized, and it remains difficult to predict with certainty how it will evolve over the coming decade. Nevertheless, it is clear that today’s major trends are likely to continue in the future, namely: a massive increase in the orbital population and, consequently, a growing dependence of States and populations on space systems; defense as the main driver behind the growth of overall public space budgets (which increased by 12% from 2023 to 2024)[1]; a strong presence of commercial actors; and space systems that tend to coexist more than they cooperate. Indeed, at first glance, space geopolitics appears to be characterized by a bipolarity embodied by the United States of America (USA) and China. Is this situation cyclical or structural? The answer may lie in space diplomacy. Far from being limited to dialogue between two space superpowers, space diplomacy now includes a growing number of States as well as commercial actors. However, the current trend points toward a regionalization of diplomatic positions, with the emergence of regional entities led by a driving state. Finally, hybrid modes of discussion are also emerging beyond Track 1—referring to traditional intergovernmental relations—such as Track 1.5 (involving state representatives and non-state actors) and Track 2 (non-governmental diplomacy).
Toward a space bipolarity?
The current situation may display certain characteristics of space bipolarity. First, the USA and China are the two States with the largest institutional space budgets. However, budgets should not be interpreted in isolation. They are also the countries that have launched the greatest mass into orbit. Moreover, their competition for power and prestige, as well as their geopolitical antagonism on Earth, tend to extend into outer space.
This results in political decisions that have a direct impact on economic ties between blocs of States. One example is the consequences of the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which do not apply solely to components used in the space sector. The extraterritorial implications of these regulations affect international space cooperation. Another example is the U.S. export restrictions on advanced technologies to China introduced in 2024, notably concerning AI chips, some of which are incorporated into space systems.
On the Chinese side, export controls on critical materials essential for semiconductor manufacturing were implemented in 2024. More recently, the USA has softened its position by allowing the export of advanced AI chips to China under specific conditions, as China’s restrictions on mineral exports had put pressure on the U.S. economy [2]. However, taken together, these politico-economic decisions contribute to a situation in which “foreign direct investment is redirected along geopolitical lines, making the global economy increasingly fragmented into geo-economic blocs.” [3] These geo-economic blocs also have a political counterpart. The domain in which this space bipolarity appears to be most clearly illustrated is that of lunar programs. Notwithstanding their substantive differences, both initiatives aim at long-term exploration of the Moon. To date, the Artemis Accords (2017) bring together 61 states. China’s international program (co-founded with Russia) to build the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS – 2021) has established official cooperation with around ten State partners. A distinctive feature of this project is that it also involves regional organizations (such as the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization and the Arab Union for Astronomy and Space Sciences), as well as research institutes and universities. For some American analysts, the quest for space leadership is now being played out between « Two competitors, two realms, two postures » [4]
Some states do not wish to be locked into this bipolar logic. However, this position is sometimes difficult to maintain. Indeed, the extraterritorial application of U.S. law constitutes a constraint that does not necessarily allow for full cooperation within each bloc simultaneously. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), for instance, had to cancel the integration of their Rashid 2 rover aboard the Chinese lunar lander Chang’e-7 due to the presence of U.S. components subject to ITAR regulations. In this regard, it will be interesting to analyze how cooperation between the UAE—signatories of the Artemis Accords—and the USA is made possible, even as the University of Sharjah in the UAE is a member of the ILRS. In addition, “several Artemis member States have restricted or suspended cooperation with China or Russia for a variety of reasons: sanctions, concerns over stealing space know-how, or official bans, such as the 2011 Wolf Amendment in the US prohibiting official cooperation with China on space matters.” [5]
In order to escape this seemingly irreversible space bipolarity, some states are turning to regional cooperation and space diplomacy.
Beyond Space Bipolarity: Regional Platforms and Track 1.5 Diplomacy
The patterns of space cooperation have significantly evolved since 2008. Since then, “the rate of formation of international space organizations has intensified. In the last 16 years, for instance, seven new space cooperatives formed vs. 12 in the previous 50 years.” [6] The most recently established “blocs” are the African Space Agency (AfSA), the Arab Space Cooperation Group (ASCG), Sino-Russian through ILRS, Artemis Accords, Latin American and Caribbean Space Agency (ALCE) and EUSPA (European Union Agency for the Space Program). “First, since 2008, distinct, bound space blocs can be clearly detected. Second, the internal composition of recent space blocs has become increasingly reflective of geopolitical affinities and strategic considerations on the ground. Third, although highly bound and distinct, the more recent space blocs are not entirely isolated and have not instituted any exclusionary practices, which is promising for the future of international space cooperation.” [7]
These space blocs appear to be motivated by the desire to exert greater influence within the current space landscape, without necessarily abandoning their previous cooperation arrangements or future partnerships with States outside their “bloc”, or even with other regional organizations. These regional space blocs thus emerge as “force multipliers that extend and strengthen their members States’ sphere of influence on the ground by providing select space capabilities or services.” [8] But what impact might the formation of these blocs have on space diplomacy? Common sense suggests that States are, by definition, stronger together than when acting individually—unity makes strength. Hypothetically, such regionalization may facilitate the development of a joint position among States that have identified certain common interests to defend. Regional space hubs may also promote a particular vision of space and its future—potentially different from or complementary to those advanced by the major space powers—and subsequently defend that vision within multilateral forums.
In this regard, the emerging space multipolarity may serve as a way to balance the strong trend toward space bipolarity embodied by the USA and China. It should nevertheless be noted that the power and influence of these blocs vary considerably. Even so, this regionalization may constitute a significant lever of influence, particularly within the United Nations system, where all States and regional organizations have a voice. In this sense, such regional platforms “can foster horizontal cooperation between emerging and established actors and create an ecosystem of trust that feeds into the multilateral system.” [9]
The UAE currently plays a leading role within the Arab Space Cooperation Group (ASCG). In addition to the UAE, the group includes the following thirteen states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia, Iraq, Mauritania, and Lebanon. The first joint project carried out by the organization has been a success: an Earth observation satellite (for Earth monitoring, environmental and climate purposes) launched on 10 December 2025. The ASCG has thus distinguished itself through scientific and technical cooperation. However, its ambition extends further, as the organization’s charter states that one of its objectives is to “coordinate the positions of the Arab Group members to adopt a unified opinion in the regional and international forums related to space (…) and work towards comprehensive Arab space coordination in the field of space.” [10]
At the same time, the UAE is encouraging hybrid diplomatic platforms. While certain discreet forums promoting Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy already exist in Europe—such as at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and the Wilton Park—the UAE also seeks to develop this form of diplomacy within the space sector. Publicly, the Abu Dhabi Space Debate is held every two years, bringing together decision-makers, representatives of space agencies, ministers, private companies, and space commands. More confidentially, in the form of a closed-door conversation under the Chatham House Rule, the Atlantic Council, a Washington, DC–based international affairs think tank founded in 1961, convened a Track 1.5 dialogue on the sidelines of the World Governments Summit (WGS) 2026 in Dubai. Held in partnership with the Council’s regional partner, AzurX, the session on “Shared Approaches to International Space Coordination and Collaboration” illustrated the emergence of regional convening hubs capable not only of facilitating dialogue, but of shaping it. By bridging governmental decision makers, industry leaders, and policy experts, such formats enable candid exchanges on sensitive strategic issues while supporting convergence between regional initiatives and broader multilateral frameworks.
Beyond space bipolarity, the UAE, along with other emerging space actors, appears to be seeking to move beyond a mere commercial diplomacy approach. Acting both independently and in cooperation, these states are fostering dialogue on issues of sustainability, coordination and governance in space through inclusive platforms that bring together governments, industry, and research institutions. By shaping practical avenues for multilateral engagement, middle space powers are contributing to a more resilient and balanced space order, one that can navigate the influence of major powers while promoting collaboration, stability, and shared norms across the rapidly evolving space landscape.
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